The 2024 Tsinghua Theory and Finance Workshop was successfully held in Chengdu from December 14 to 16, 2024. Co-organized by Tsinghua University PBC School of Finance (Tsinghua PBCSF) and Tsinghua University National Institute of Financial Research, the event was hosted by the Institute of Financial Studies (IFS) at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE).
Speakers at the workshop
The workshop, hosted by Zhen Zhou, Associate Professor at Tsinghua PBCSF, brought together leading scholars and experts from prestigious universities in Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR, as well as from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other countries or regions. The participants engaged in in-depth exchanges and discussions on cutting-edge theoretical research in corporate finance and information economics.
Zhen Zhou hosting the workshop
Jun Liu, Acting Dean of the IFS at SWUFE and Professor at the Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, delivered the opening remarks. Professor Liu expressed his sincere gratitude to all attendees and emphasized his hope that participants would fully engage in academic exchanges and the sharing of ideas during the workshop. He then provided an overview of the founding background and development philosophy of the IFS at SWUFE.
Jun Liu delivering the opening remarks
Andrey Malenko, Professor in the Seidner Department of Finance at the Boston College Carroll School of Management, delivered a keynote speech titled "Voting Choice." His presentation explored the principal-agent dilemmas in corporate governance between fund investors and fund managers. Traditionally, fund managers have exercised voting rights on behalf of fund investors. However, this established practice has sparked intense debate, particularly as the voting power of fund managers has become more centralized and investor disagreements over issues like environmental policies have grown. In response, leading fund managers have started offering their investors a choice: they can either delegate their voting rights to the fund or vote independently, a concept referred to as "Voting Choice." Research suggests that when voting choices are offered due to the heterogeneous preferences of investors, it may lead to an excessive retention of voting rights by investors. This overemphasis on individual preferences could result in inefficient decisions, ultimately reducing the overall welfare of investors. In contrast, providing investors with voting choices can enhance their welfare if voting choices are made available because investors have private information that is not accessible to the fund manager. However, if acquiring information is costly, offering voting choices could lead to coordination failure and less informed voting outcome.
Andrey Malenko delivering keynote speech
The workshop featured one keynote speech and six sessions, covering a range of innovative topics in financial theory, including cutting-edge issues such as principal-agent problem in corporate governance between fund investors and fund managers, the regulation of dynamic contracts, the dynamic relationship between founders and venture capital, the information aggregation in dynamic trading, and information design with applications in bank regulation. Scholars at the workshop engaged in active and lively discussions, with the papers presenting rich content and novel findings.
Workshop attendees
The Tsinghua Theory and Finance Workshop, initiated and hosted by Tsinghua PBCSF, aims to provide a high-level platform for economic and financial scholars worldwide to discuss theoretical research. The workshop focuses on the latest developments in financial theory and practice. Moving forward, it will continue to uphold a rigorous and open-minded approach, aiming to attract more distinguished financial scholars and cutting-edge academic research, thereby establishing itself as a key benchmark for international financial theory conferences.
