Government
involvement has been pro-market, says Zhu Ning of Tsinghua University
The Economist
By Zhu Ning
This is a guest
contribution to our debate: Should the West worry about the threat to liberal
values posed by China's rise?
China has delivered some of the most
outstanding economic growth the world has seen in the past half-century. Not
only has it successfully increased its GDP per person more than 20-fold and
lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty since it launched
its reform-and-opening policy some four decades ago, China has also managed to
become a global leader in new technologies such as big data, artificial
intelligence and mobile internet applications.
Now that China appears set to overtake
the US as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade, it seems
inevitable that more countries and global leaders will debate whether China has
established a new model of economic development. They will ask whether this new
model will challenge or even topple the traditional model of free-market
economics, which hitherto has been widely regarded as the underpinning of
economic growth elsewhere. China’s GDP per person is still below $12,000, which
is commonly regarded as the minimum for a high-income country. But hardly
anybody disputes that China has done a fantastic job with growing its economy.
It seems inevitable that more countries
and global leaders will debate whether China has established a new model of
economic development.
Some people attribute China’s success
partly to its extensive geographical area and the homogeneity of its language,
culture and values—assets which are conducive to forming a giant domestic
market that can propel economic growth. However, this does not explain why
China’s economy faced considerable challenges before the launch of the
reform-and-opening policy in the late 1970s. Even though most agree that this
policy has played a vital role in the delivery of China’s growth miracle,
opinions diverge as to which aspects of the policy have proved most effective.
The prevailing view before 2000 was that
China’s success mainly resulted from the encouragement it gave to market
forces. Starting in the agricultural sector, the allocation of labour gradually
became determined by the market rather than by government central-planners.
This transition put the right people into the right jobs, unleashed
entrepreneurial initiative and made workers more productive. After initial
success with labour reform, other important inputs such as land and capital
were also gradually exposed to market forces. This encouraged China’s economy
to perform more like a market one.
More recently, however, especially in
the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, some have contended that China
is unique in terms of the resourcefulness and determination of its government
in the pursuit of economic growth. Somewhat controversially, one method used by
the government to promote growth has been through the planning and guidance of
industrial development. By designating certain industries as strategic and
giving them priority in the allocation of resources, China has successfully
established competitive advantages in many sectors. This has helped the growth
of exports and the economy as a whole.
In addition, China has used
counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies to provide much-needed capital
whenever economic growth slows down and investment slumps. This has played a
critical role in maintaining the speed of economic growth, as well as in
reinforcing the confidence of investors in the government’s willingness to
intervene in the market. So households and entrepreneurs have faith that growth
will continue, which has encouraged capital formation.
Of course, some argue that such active
interference by the state is neither unique to China, nor is it sustainable.
Almost all countries in East Asia have followed, to varying degrees, the so
called “East Asia model” established by Japan. This involves the use of government
power to promote a nation’s competitive advantage, such as by helping
labour-intensive industries at the outset of development and later using fiscal
subsides to sustain fast economic growth and achieve global dominance.
Maybe China’s
model does not pose a challenge. Rather, it may be in harmony with the
free-market-based paradigm of neo-classical economics.
China’s growth before the global
financial crisis of 2008 did bear some resemblance to the East Asian model. But
China’s political system, including the way its civil service is run, sets it
apart from countries such as Japan or South Korea. The performance of local
government officials is assessed on the basis of the speed of economic growth
within the officials’ jurisdiction. This gives officials a strong incentive to
ensure that growth in their area is as fast as possible. This system is very
effective in ensuring the implementation of the government’s “growth priority”
policy nationwide.
Even though it is common among emerging
economies for governments to intervene to ensure economic growth, China’s
ability to make this work is probably unmatched elsewhere. Not only can the
central government mobilise huge resources to boost growth and guide industrial
development, it can also control prices in order to avoid inflation and asset
bubbles. China’s financial system remains segregated from the rest of the
global financial system, which has helped it to mitigate the impact of the
financial tsunami resulting from the global crisis of 2008.
But it is critical to bear in mind that
most of China’s economic policies during the past decades have been pro-market
and pro-efficiency. If anything, China’s economic reforms have demonstrated the
vitality of free-market liberalism. There is a growing body of research
confirming that a pro-market environment at the local level has been
instrumental in delivering economic growth, as well as in boosting the
efficiency of companies, promoting consumption and reducing the risk of asset
bubbles.
So maybe China’s model does not pose a
challenge. Rather, it may be in harmony with the free-market-based paradigm of
neo-classical economics. China’s government has proved that it can provide
important and sometimes indispensable remedies when the market fails—an ability
that economic theory had failed to predict it could master. With such
involvement by the government, it is possible that economies elsewhere might
perform better, even if they become less “free”.
It could be argued that China’s success
does not raise questions about the correctness of market-based economics, but
only about the best way to perfect the market. It may be that China’s
experience will eventually provide an answer to the hitherto unresolved
question of how to ensure sustained high-quality growth while integrating more
closely with the global economic and financial system and opening up domestic
markets in service and financial industries.
Zhu
Ning is the deputy dean at the National Institute of Financial Research at
Tsinghua University and a professor at the Shanghai Advanced Institute of
Finance. He is also a faculty fellow at Yale University’s International Center
for Finance. He is the author of several books, including China’s Guaranteed
Bubble (McGraw-Hill; 2016).